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ABSTRACT   
The government of Argentina has put in place extractive political and institutional processes 
that have been ripe for rent seeking activity and that have supported the interests of urban elites, 
voters, and populist politicians to the detriment of rural and export-oriented agricultural interests.  
However, it is unclear how these policies influence growth in agricultural markets. 
The global population is projected to grow to nine billion by 2050 and will severely test our 
abilities if we do not understand how to put in place the most efficient and productive political-
economic systems to promote the most efficient production of food, fiber, and fuel.  Nature has 
blessed few countries in the world as it has Argentina with fertile land and climate and few have 
been governed as badly as the populist Argentine gov rnments have over the past 70 years as it has 
systematically plundered the Pampas and its exports to placate their urban constituencies and prop 
up their failing economic policies. 
I will examine Argentine agriculture with an analysis of long-run historical data and 
comparing the data for crop production systems (Corn, Soy, and Wheat) against data that 
demonstrates aggressive and extractive trade policies.  Isolating for these extractive taxation 
policies and programs should provide opportunities for comparison and allow better understanding 
of the effects that rules and governance have had on agricultural production in Argentina. 
The data suggest that Argentine agricultural output, m ch of which is exported, has been 
negatively impacted by the trade and tax policies pur ued by the Argentina governments since 
2003.  Since export profitability is hampered (and potentially eliminated) by high import taxes, 
export taxes, and an overvalued exchange rate, the farmers / producers have made decisions on crop 
production.  Producer investment in efficient production methods has been lower than it could have 
been.  In addition, there has been a dramatic change in the mix of crops produced that could lead to 
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION  
The aggregate data for agricultural production in Argentina since the first Kirchner 
Administration came into office in 2003 is impressive.  Total Agricultural Production (TAP) has 
continued to rise and has helped fuel the growth in e Argentine Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).  Agricultural production has more than doubled from $15 billion in 2003 to $36 billion 
in 2013.   The agricultural share of the Argentine GDP has gone from 8.4% to 9.4% during the 
same period.  This growth corresponds to a time when t  government of Argentina was 
implementing policies that should not be favorable to conomic growth, overall economic or 
agricultural.  What can explain this contradiction f r our expectations of free market 
economics?  We understand that farmer behavior is shaped by agricultural policies as well as 
other factors such as technological innovations and international commodity prices.  Are the 
impacts from domestic agricultural policies hidden in the data?  Are the farmers in Argentina 
reacting more to national policies than to global mrket forces as they plan production or vice 
versa?  Is it possible that these production decisions are having a negative impact on the 
production of food in Argentina?  
The decision in 2012 by President Cristina Kirchner’s government to re-nationalize YPF 
(Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales), the Argentinean oil company controlled by Spanish 
company Repsol, took many by surprise.  However, it should not have surprised anyone.   The 
Argentine economy has experienced a number of adverse developments over the past three 
decades, from the historic sovereign default in 2001, to very high inflation, to civil unrest 
caused by shortages of basic necessities.  The developm nts have led to a dramatic weakening 
of the productive and economic vibrancy within the country, significantly impacting its 




in the chart below, the international reserves held by Argentina have steadily eroded.  Trying to 
slow this currency flight, the Argentine government has recently imposed even more stringent 
controls on the movement of capital and has gained firm control of the Argentine Central Bank. 
Figure 1 – Currency Reserves & Balance of Payments - Argentina 
 
  (Calculated from World Bank Data, 2014) 
Argentina at the beginning of the 20th century had the ninth largest economy in the 
world.  Their agricultural production rivaled that of the United States.  However, Argentina has 
also been a case study of how extractive political and economic systems affect the development 
of economies.  Political institutions that are “extractive” are the opposite of the well-
functioning, pluralistic institutions in democratic societies where “inclusive” institutions are the 
norm.  There is a natural and powerful synergy betwe n economic and political institutions 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 480).  Nations that ve developed extractive political 
processes tend to concentrate power and influence into the hands of narrow elites.  The populist 
governments in Argentina are a prime example of this p enomenon.  The economic institutions 
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become economically extractive as well.  Extractive economic institutions are those that extract 
the incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset.  The extractive 
economic institutions will, in turn, enrich the same elites who control the political processes, 
thus allowing them to further consolidate political dominance (Michels, 1962). 
What are these “institutions” that have been so extractive in Argentina?  The definition 
for institutions in this context is broad.  One can thi k of institutions as a system of rules, 
beliefs, and organizations.  Grief coined the broad definition as “a system of institutional 
elements that conjointly generate a regularity of behavior by enabling, guiding, and motivating 
it” (Grief, 1993).  The rules within an institutional framework coordinate behavior and enable 
people to act efficiently.  The belief in this institu ional framework is also important.  Even in 
formal structures, people have to be motivated to foll w the rules.  This is even more important 
in informal structures.  Informal institutions are sustainable only if people believe that their 
actions will result in a reward or punishment (Grief, 1993).  The political framework in 
Argentina has allowed the political elite to extrac value from the agricultural sector to the 
benefit of their own political interests, for example, preventing civil unrest due to rising food 
costs.  One example of how this extraction is carried out has been the imposition of quantitative 
export restrictions.  As international commodity prices increased in the mid-2000s due to 
increased demand from China and India, the Argentin government became concerned that 
agricultural producers would raise prices in line with the international prices and that would 
cause food prices to rise.  The government implemented a series of export restrictions and price 
controls that focused on the commodities most closely associated with food and were intended 
to maintain a reasonable price and domestic supply for these products.  Because these policies 




lower availability of the very products they were intended to make more abundant (Nogués, 
2011). 
For comparative discussion, inclusive institutions are the opposite of this situation.  
When countries have inclusive political and economic institutions, everyone gets a chance to 
participate in the political process, everyone has t e opportunity to start a new business, and 
everyone has the chance to save and invest (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 70).  According to 
Acemoglu and Robinson, much of the early economic growth experienced by Argentina in the 
past century was driven by extractive political and economic institutions and involved little 
creative destruction or innovation.  Much like the Soviet Union in the 1950s and China in the 
2000s, these types of economic systems can experienc  rapid growth, but this growth is not 
sustainable for the long term (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 47). 
Figure 2 - Map of South America & Argentina 
 
(University of Texas, 2014) 
 
 
Nature has blessed few countries in the world with the bounty of fertile land and 
accommodating climate as it has in Argentina.  
only 2.23% but Argentina produce
of this hyper-productive farmland is concentrated in the Pampas region.  
provinces of Sante Fe, Cordoba, Buenoe Aires, Entre Rios, and La Papa, the Pampas is an 
ecoregion that is ideally suited for farming.  Over 80% of the 
production in Argentina takes place in this Pampas region.
below. 
Figure 3 - Map of Pampas Region, Argentina
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sustained manipulation through policies enacted to ex ract economic rents from the agricultural 
producers.  The Argentine economy overall has continued to decline since 2003 due to the role 
successive Populist Kirchner governments have played in attempting to control market forces 
through the imposition of populist tax and regulatory policies. (Fairfield, 2011)  
A fundamental economic premise of the Chicago neoclassical school of economic 
thought is that free market economics and the inclusive institutions to support it have the ability 
to improve the economic well-being of all those peol  fortunate enough to participate in them.  
This approach is the neoliberal theory.  It is the middle ground between the more laissez-faire 
doctrine of classical liberalism and the doctrine of collectivist central planning.  Neoliberalism 
promotes the advantages of a market economy that operates with the guidance and rules 
established by a strong state actor.  In this construct, in order to be successful, free market 
activities require good rules and governance.  When rules and governance are more transparent 
and efficient, it becomes easier for individuals and e trepreneurs to improve their own 
economic well-being.  While there are no purely good rules or completely transparent 
governance, with “better” rules and governance, indiv duals and firms can accomplish improved 
economic conditions within the rule of law and be assured that what they create and earn will be 
theirs to keep.  Although no nation has absolutely transparent institutions, it is the spectrum of 
institutional governance we should be most interestd in.   
Good political governance requires the widest distribu ion of political power along with 
limits to those in power.  When nations establish rules and governance that are less transparent, 
when individual property is not secure, and when regulation, governance, and taxation are 
burdensome, accomplishment in any endeavor (business, agriculture, or otherwise) becomes 




efficient and innovative (Ground R. L., 2011).  Success becomes dependent more on whom you 
know than on what you can do.  In technical terms, thi  economic rent is the difference between 
what a group is paid and what they should have beenpaid for their labor, capital, or land to 
remain in their current use.  Examples of rent-seeking activities are forming cartels and 
lobbying for rules that benefit one group at the expense of competitors or customers.  While this 
happens to some degree in every country, it seems to be at a higher level of occurrence in 
Argentina.  The populist-oriented Argentine governme ts have systematically plundered the 
agricultural industry in order to placate urban elites, voters, and politicians (Richardson, 2008, 
p. 239).  Good economic governance provides solid property rights, contract enforcement, 
competitive markets, and the freedom for individuals to choose their economic endeavors 
(Helpman E. , 2004, p. 112) (Prasad, 2003, p. 753).  An interesting and key conceptual 
perspective on the history of political governance in Argentina is that the same extractive 
economic policies have been in place despite regime change over time.  The notable period of 
exception to this was the 1990s.   
Argentina’s governments have sacrificed good governance for political gain and 
electoral politics and have implemented policies that seem designed to concentrate political 
powers.  The political elites have failed to adhere to basic principles of providing good 
economic governance (Gallo, 2012).  This does not mean necessarily that there was some clever 
malfeasance on the part of the political elite.  It is also a function of the development of 
democratic processes in Argentina.  Elected leaders often act in rational manner to retain voter 
loyalty and maintain their position of power, even when the consequence of these actions may 
be detrimental.  The extractive political and institutional processes of democracy in Argentina 




burdensome regulation and prohibitive trade barriers that have limited competition and kept the 
nation’s resources from being put to their best use.  This has been especially true in agriculture 
where producers have had to contend with the natural risks as well as the market risks to earn 
their livelihoods.  The definition of agricultural producers includes the range of people and 
organizations engaged in farming to create economic value.   
The issue of efficient food production also has impacts and influence beyond 
Argentina’s borders.  The global population is projected to grow to nine billion by 2050 and 
will severely test our ability to feed and clothe tm if we do not understand how to put in place 
the most efficient and productive agricultural systems to promote the most efficient production 
of food, fiber, and fuel.  Argentina needs to be part of the global solution to this growing need.  
The current trends in the regulation and taxation of Argentina agriculture seem likely to trigger 
a decline in farm output (The Economist, 30 Sep 2013). 
Some political leaders in Argentina have attempted to reverse this course and develop 
more liberalized market mechanisms.  In 1991, Argentina began a series of reforms and 
privatizations that showed some promise of stabilizing the economy.  Economic activity was 
deregulated, companies owned by the government were privatized, and the state pulled back 
from its interventions in most economic activity (Gallo, 2012).  The government also pegged 
the Argentine Peso to the US dollar with the “Convertibility Plan” (Quispe-Agnoli & Kay, 
2013).  These changes eased much of the instability tha  had plagued the economy in the post-
Peron years.  These changes toward better economic g vernance came at a social price.  The 
problem was that pegging the Peso to the US dollar created a crisis situation of its own with an 
over-valued currency (The Economist, 1999).  This led to increased borrowing and spending on 




competitive was to reduce the domestic price.  Thisoption of course was limited to the point 
where the cost to produce is equal to the price.  Production slowed, unemployment rose, and 
poverty grew.   Massive borrowing by the government in order to ease the issues related to the 
fixed exchange rate in turn made the Argentinean eco omy susceptible to external shocks.   
This shock came in the form of reduced commodities prices beginning in 1998. (The 
Economist, 1999) 
Even as this recession deepened in 2001 and 2002, the politicians in Buenos Aries could 
not devalue the currency due to the strict Convertibility Plan.  They were in effect stuck with an 
overvalued exchange rate, severely hampering agricultural exports (Gallo, 2012, p. 55).  
Exploding government debt, coupled with the inability to reduce governmental bureaucracy and 
spending, led to a flight of capital and chronic budget deficits.  The failure of the political 
leadership to provide a solid governance and regulatory environment subsequently led to the 
largest sovereign debt default in modern history.  The government abrogated its responsibility to 
creditors to repay more than $93 Billion (USD) in external debts.  Argentina issued its first 
moratorium on debt repayment as far back as 1891.  They have done so several times in the 
interim and most recently in July 2014.  Potential creditors recognized this as a risk.  Working 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these cr ditors insisted that Argentina agree that 
any litigation resulting from loans be subject to US (New York) law.  Of course, in the 
intervening years the Kirchner government has fought this interpretation as well. 
In the default of 2001, and in keeping with the political need to resist taking the blame 
for trouble, the government in Argentina needed to find a scapegoat.  Barbieri points out that 
rather than view this default as the result of their own failures, the populist politicians in Buenos 




creditors and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Barbieri, 2012).  An interesting note to 
the crisis in 2001 was that there was no military intervention as there had been in past episodes.  
The default put an end to the period of structural reform and left the Argentine population 
permanently suspicious of liberal market reform (Lead rs, 2014).  It also gave rise to a regime 
in which populist government programs were resurgent.  Successive Kirchner governments first 
elected in 2003 have instituted economic policies that have led to high growth rates but have 
also led to even higher inflation rates (Richardson, 2008, p. 239).    The policies pursued by the 
Kirchner administrations were extractive taxes thatdirectly appropriated income produced by 
agricultural exports for use by the government to fund populist programs (Richardson, 2008, p. 
231).  For example, the Kirchner government provided funds to subsidize resources and 
services important to urban areas, particularly energy (electricity, petroleum, and natural gas) 
and public transportation.  The government also used th  revenue from the agricultural taxes to 
pay for increased public sector salaries and pensions. 
In another example of how populist programs have distorted the market, the Argentine 
government has had to subsidize the continued producti n of bread for domestic consumption.  
Directly due to the government-imposed price controls and export restrictions on wheat, wheat 
producers and mills lack the market incentives to continue production.  In order to maintain 
domestic prices and supply, the government issues sb idies directed to producers to 
compensate them for the difference between internatio l prices and the lower, government 
imposed domestic prices (Richardson, 2008).  According to Richardson, both wheat farmers and 
flour mills have received these subsidies. Farmers s lling to the mills for the domestic market 
receive the official price from the mills and then have to submit paperwork to the government to 




program is not to increase total production but rather o increase the share of production 
destined for the domestic market, at prices below those in the international market (Richardson, 
2008, p. 231). 
Since the financial crisis in 2001, the Argentine government has leveraged the value of 
agricultural export to support the populist policies by providing the government with funding.  
The huge increases in soybean cultivation provided a unique opportunity for the Kirchner 
governments to tax these commodities without the tax having a direct impact on the price on 
domestic food products.  The boom in soybean production aused by the transition to 
genetically-modified (GM) soybeans has led to a continuous expansion of harvested area, 
record production levels, and record profits from the exports.  The expansion of GM soybean 
production has been coupled with exploding internatio l demand.  Rising incomes in China, 
India, and other developing economies increased demand for soybeans and soybean products as 
the populations of these countries increased the levels of protein in their diets.  Specialty 
markets like biofuels, industrial oils, and composite materials also added to the increased global 
demand for soy and its derivatives.   
The financial collapse that Argentina experienced in 2001 plunged nearly half of the 
population into poverty when the unemployment rate eached nearly 21% (Economist, 2008).  
However, the farmers in the agricultural industry were certainly benefiting from the economic 
changes.  Fairfield estimates that the producer profits would have been 55% lower in 2003 and 
2004 if the exchange rate had remained one-to-one as under the Convertibility plan (Fairfield, 
2011, p. 432).  The real value of the Argentine peso r lative to the US dollar fell by more than 
60%, making Argentine manufactured goods and agricultural commodities much more 




Figure 4 - Exchange Rate Changes 
 
(Calculated from World Bank Data, 2014) 
 Farmers exporting grain were enjoying the run up in grain prices on the international 
markets along with the immediate impact of the massive currency devaluation.  In turn and in 
response to these changes, the government imposed export taxes on agricultural products of 
around 20%, depending on the product.  The government justified this temporary measure 
saying it would, first, discourage the farmers from exporting all of their grain and causing a 
domestic shortage, and, second, it would contribute directly to the government’s budget 
shortfall and help stabilize the economy.  Unfortunately, the temporary measure became 
permanent while the need was only temporary.  To be fair, Argentina did not just tax the export 
of agricultural products.  The government applied export taxes on many different products 
depending on policy objectives at the time.  The avr ge export tax on all products ranged from 
a high of 15% in 1975 to 0% in 1999.  During the Kirchner administrations, the export taxes 
have averaged 8-9%. 
The development of the export-focused, soybean industry in Argentina provided an 
















exports to support the government’s populist programs.  Since 2003, the government has taxed 
exports, agricultural grain in particular, between 20% and 35%.  The logic that the Kirchner 
governments have used to justify this policy tactic is that because international commodity 
prices have gone up, farmers have enjoyed a “windfall” profit that they did not earn and should 
not be allowed to keep (Economist, 2008).  The imposed export taxes served several purposes.  
They extracted revenue needed by the government and supported the administration’s industrial 
policies.  The revenue helped support the democratic process by allowing politicians to offer the 
electorate needed resources and services.  The taxes also supported the desire of the politicians 
to keep domestic food prices from rising and causing domestic unrest by discouraging exports 
of food commodities to ensure domestic supply (Fairfield, 2011, p. 426).   
The strategy to manage the supply and price of domestic food has resulted in taxing 
farm revenue and limiting access to international mrkets at a time when, also due to 
governmental policy, inflation has raised input costs (fertilizer, machinery, and seed) for these 
same agricultural producers by more than 25% per year.  At the same time, the government has 
been attempting to prop up the Peso relative to the US Dollar.  This has made the Peso 60% 
stronger than it should be if allowed to trade freely (Farming without Fields, 4 January 2014).  
These factors have worked together to make the food crops that Argentina’s farmers could 
produce abundantly and efficiently too expensive on the international markets to be competitive 
(The Economist, 30 Sep 2013).  It is the combination of high international demand for soybean 
commodities, the high cost of production inputs for food crops like corn and wheat, and the 
natural capacity of Argentina to produce soybeans that has contributed significantly to the 
growth in soy production and export.  These market factors have also dramatically changed the 




demand in the international markets have forced farmers to make cropping choices heavily 
weighted to soybean production.  It is also clear th t due to the government’s ability to tax this 
commodity, the move to soybean production has been instrumental in helping the Argentine 
economy to stay afloat over the past decade.   
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Argentina began to grow in 2003 and has 
continued to grow over the past decade.  While it is clear that GDP has continued to grow 
through the 2000’s despite the default, the growth has not been because Argentina’s producers 
and manufacturing have become more competitive and efficient.  The growth has been due to 
the devaluation of the Peso coupled with the rise in international commodity prices.  
Figure 5 - Gross Domestic Product & Agriculture Contribution, 1990-2010 
 
(Calculated from World Bank Data, 2014) 
 Inflation experienced in Argentina since 2004 has c used much of this advantage from 
the lower exchange rate to diminish.  However, producers have been able to maintain their 
production (in spite of the export taxes) due to rising international commodity prices for soy 
products (Lence, 2010, p. 423).  The increasing pressure on agricultural producer margins over 
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favorable world market conditions, and the taxes on exports are leading to diminishing incentive 
for agricultural producers to invest and produce food crops, causing the producers to move more 
and more of their productive capacity to soybean production (The Economist, 2013).   
As the trade surplus in Argentina has dwindled, the Kirchner government has beefed up 
its industrial policy aimed at protecting domestic industries.  According to Global Trade Alert, 
Argentina now imposes more trade limitations (the current count is 199) deemed “harmful” than 
any other country in the world.  Russia is second with 174 protectionist measures. (Global 
Trade Alert, 2012).  The harsh economic climate created by the government has caused many of 
Argentina’s agricultural businesses shrink their operations.  El Tejar, once Argentina’s largest 
farming group and still the largest in Latin America, has reduced its cultivated acreage from 
300,000 in 2006-2007 to less than 75,000 acres for 2012-2013.  The company has also moved 
its headquarters operation from Argentina to Brazil. (Farming Without Fields, 2014) 
The Puzzle: 
So what has been (or will be) the ultimate impact of the government’s political 
governance and trade policies on Argentina’s economic fortunes?  Most free market economists 
would expect the protectionist trade policies implemented by the Kirchner government to have a 
negative impact on GDP.  However, it is puzzling that GDP has continued to grow.  Most of 
these same economists would expect Total Agricultural P oduction (TAP) to also diminish with 
the imposition of import substitution polices that ve targeted agricultural production directly.  
But again, it is puzzling when most scholars and economists suggest that this is not the case and 
that TAP has continued to grow at a reasonable level. 
I suggest that Argentine agricultural output, much of which is exported, has been and 
will be impacted by the protectionist policies implemented to promote domestic manufacturing 




interesting puzzle.  Are the effects from the protectionist policies hidden somehow in the 
underlying agricultural industry data and not as clearly evident in the data for Total Agricultural 
Production?  Although agricultural productivity has appeared to continue to rise, are there 
underlying impacts that will affect productivity inthe long term?  Have the trade policies had an 
impact on the level of investment by the agricultural industry?  Have the trade policies caused 
changes in the make-up of the commodities produced in Argentina and causing producers to 
favor growing some crops (soybeans) over others (wheat/corn).   
Since export profitability and therefore farm revenu  is hampered (or even eliminated) 
by high import taxes, export taxes, and an overvalued exchange rate, agricultural investment 
may be the underlying data that shows where the trad  policies have had an impact on the 
industry.  I suggest that although the TAP has remained at reasonable levels, Argentine 
producers have changed their cropping practices due to the taxation policies pursued over the 
past decade and have moved to crops that offer better them efficiency and profitability.  The 
unintended consequence of these policies has been to move farmers away from food production.    
It is possible that a correlation exists between the level of agricultural investment, the 
rapid adoption of genetically-modified seed, the production of those crops intended for human 
consumption (food), and the aggressiveness of the prot ctionist trade policies pursued by the 
Argentine government since 2003.  A high correlation between tax and trade policies and the 
mix of crops used for human consumption should indicate a move away from food production 
and toward non-food, genetically-modified, soybean production.   
I will look for correlation between Total Agricultural Production and agricultural 
investment.  I define agricultural investment as those expenditures made by agricultural 




necessarily defining causation, the higher levels of taxation should be associated with lower 
investment.  A parallel pattern over time would indicate further that the protectionist policies 
have had no impact.  A divergent pattern in the data would indicate that extractionary tax and 
trade policies are related to investment in agricultura  and on the mix of commodity crops 
produced in Argentina.  This may also be an indicator that the effects on Total Agricultural 
Production in Argentina are still pending and will develop in the future.   
The fundamental problem is that farmers in Argentina are reacting to internal incentives 
generating from the political environment rather than to the global market forces and prices.  
This suggests that there are hidden costs to the Arg ntine agricultural industry and to the 
Argentine economy as a whole.  However, these costs do not appear in the national aggregate 
data, for either agriculture or the economy. 
After the chapter one introduction, chapter two reviews the current literature available 
on the subject.  Chapter three describes the research methods I have used in this study.  Chapter 
four provides a look at the results and the analysis of the data.  Chapter five concludes with a 





CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
The theory is based on the idea that the liberal market or free market economic approach 
is the best structure we have for the efficient production of food.  The assumption is that 
government interference in agricultural market economics has distortional effects and these 
effects will often have negative impacts on productivity.  I have organized my review of 
relevant literature beginning with a review of the ory underpinning free market economics 
and how extractive political and economic systems negatively affect productive activities.  I 
also review the potential impacts Argentine monetary and trade policies have had on the 
agricultural sector as the government has pursued import substitution to protect domestic 
manufacturing.   
Extractive Policies and Rent Seeking 
The economic deterioration in Argentina in the past several years has been the subject of 
many studies.  There remains some debate about the caus s of the decline, especially from those 
with Keynesian points of view.   This economic school f thought, first promoted by John 
Maynard Keynes, would advocate for a more active rol  by governments to control the 
economic excesses inherent in capitalism.  Keynesia economists advocate a mixed economy – 
predominantly private sector, but with an increasing role for government intervention during 
downturns in economic activity (Binder, 2014).  Keyn sians in Argentina have criticized the 
shortcomings of the market system and would argue that the reasons Argentina has not been as 
successful as it could have been is due to the government not intervening enough to overcome 
the shortcomings (Bresser-Pereira, 2012).  The Keynesia  argument is that correcting the 




barriers to protect developing Argentine industries from foreign competition.  This activism 
would also include allocating public money to areas needed most by society.  This economic 
approach has been effective during times of economic crisis and recession.  However, the 
approach to stimulating a national economy through government stimulus spending is 
unsustainable over time. 
Contrary to the Keynesian theory, free market economists would conclude the cause of 
Argentina’s decline is the unintended consequences of government interference in the market.  
This is coupled with the extractive nature of the Argentine institutional framework.  Fulginiti 
and Perrin assert that while growth strategies in Argentina have focused on domestic 
manufacturing production, inconsistent economic policies and market intervention by the state, 
coupled with irrational responses to external stimuli, have been most responsible for the decline. 
(Fulginiti & Perrin, 1993).  Argentina seems to challenge the notion that Keynesian theories are 
unsustainable and have maintained aggressive government policies and stimulus through 
successive democratic regimes.  However, it is the contrary.  These policies have helped create 
the recurring crisis in Argentina.  This is directly in line with my thesis that the challenges 
Argentina is facing are directly related to the lack of good rules and governance implemented by 
the elite political classes.  
Supporting the free market school of thought, in his book, “The Mystery of Economic 
Growth”, Helpman makes a convincing free market argument that the protection of property 
rights, the provision of necessary public goods (like infrastructure and education, and 
potentially health care), the maintenance of macroeconomic and monetary stability, and at least 
some level of openness in economic and trade activity are crucial to economic growth (Helpman 




and there may not be a singular model that works in every case, there are a handful of 
fundamental principles that create the environment for increased economic activity and growth.  
Helpman argues further that it is these same principles that can help explain why some nations 
and regions have flourished in agriculture while others have not, even when the other areas 
should have prospered given their comparative advantages in soil and climate.  In the debate 
between the primacy of institutions or geography as determinants of agricultural income and 
wealth, Helpman argues that the evidence strongly suggests the primacy of institutions and 
governance (Helpman E. , 2004, pp. 128-131).    
Governance and Economics Problems with Export Driven Commodity Economies 
The impact of a nation’s reliance on the export of commodities or natural resources has 
also been the subject of some analysis and debate.  Th re has been significant analysis of the 
particular impact commodity exports (primarily raw materials but also virgin agricultural 
commodities) have had on the political and economic history of Latin America.  Cardoso has 
linked the reliance on exports to economic under development and argues that an overreliance 
on commodity exports has led to a lack of economic development in Latin America.  He favors 
a reduction of reliance on single exports in favor of government investment aimed at 
diversification of industries and exports (Cardoso, 1979).  Commodities like oil, iron ore, 
copper, lumber, soybeans and meat have accounted for 52% of the region’s exports, according 
to the World Bank (The World Bank, 2014).  Cardoso and Faletto sought to return the thinking 
to political economics rather than just economics to understand the development of Latin 
American agriculture.  This perspective certainly supports the argument on the primacy of rules 
and governance implemented by the state rather than geography, culture, or climate to explain 
the difference in developmental trajectories of nations and regions.  Centeno further links an 




weakness in Centeno’s argument is that he is overly d pendent on what the central state 
governments have not done, namely, they have not developed strong central governments with 
the requisite institutions to tax populations, organize large, modern armies, and integrate 
national populations. 
An over reliance on primary commodity resources and exports can affect the efficient 
functioning of government and the development of good institutions.  Countries like Argentina 
that have an abundance of natural resources (like oil and mineral wealth) as well as the wealth 
of agricultural commodities tend to have lower economic growth and slower development.  
Collier defines this natural resource abundance as a trap (Collier, 2007, pp. 38-40).  According 
to Collier, the resource curse can cause the normal functions of democratic institutions to 
malfunction.  In natural resource-rich countries, the ruling elite are frequently rewarded for 
bribery and patronage.  Collier terms this “survival of the fattest”.   The rents from resource 
abundance cause distortions with how governmental au hority is gained (elections) as well as in 
how the elected ultimately uses that authority (checks and balances).   This often leads to a 
distortion in the relationship between government and citizens.  In economies that are 
dominated by natural resources or primary commodity exports, government can often rely on 
income from the commodities rather than from taxes on citizens.  This will typically make 
government less responsive to the needs of their citizens (Collier, 2007, p. 42).   Dependence on 
natural resources can also lead to excessive government borrowing.  This in turn causes 
problems when the resource revenue declines due to world prices and the government can no 
longer borrow enough money to provide for services.    
An over reliance on commodity exports can also leadto Dutch disease.  This is an issue 




economy due to distortions in exchange rates (Collier, 2007, p. 39).  Too much commodity 
export causes a country’s currency to rise in value gainst other currencies and makes other 
products produced within an economy less competitiv n price on the world market, as well as 
domestically.  This effect by commodities on the exchange rates and the comparative advantage 
of other trading goods can be offset, for example, by adopting free trade rules and by managing 
government finances in a consistently countercyclical fashion (Ground, 2012).  However, the 
government in Argentina has not been able to manage the need to counter these effects and have 
squandered the windfalls. 
Acemoglu and Robinson have explained why some countries are prosperous and 
efficient agricultural producers while other countries are not (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 
331).  Although there are economists who have used geography or culture to explain the 
inequality of economic fortunes, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that it is not differences in soil, 
environment, culture, or even geography that can explain why one nation has efficient 
agricultural producers while another nation does not.  They looked extensively at the effect of 
the same overall economic rules and governance that Helpman reviewed and then specifically at 
the impact these institutions have had on Argentine agricultural production (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012, p. 331).   
In spite of variations in attributes, the differenc in economic success is more the 
consequence of property rights (land ownership) along with the rules and governance imposed 
by the governments and institutions.  When property rights are weak, capital is less likely to 
invest in productive activities because there is les assurance in the ownership of the resulting 
gain.  Extractive taxation also has the effect of reducing the value of real property.  For 




activity, he is less likely to invest in land improvement.  In the annexation of YPF, the 
Argentine government demonstrated that oil companies should not risk their investment in 
Argentina because the state might take it away.  Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the base 
reason Argentina cannot seem to remove itself from the regular cycle of economic collapse is 
the very nature of their extractive political and economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012, p. 331).  Exclusionary and extractive systems have been prevalent throughout the history 
of modern Argentina.  The early growth that Argentina experienced was a classic case of 
growth through an extractive economic system and was not sustainable in the long term 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p. 331). 
Results / Impacts to Argentine Production Post-Crisis 
So what would cause this economically prosperous contry to make political decisions 
that would cause one of their primary industries to decline economically?  These decisions are a 
direct result of the nature of the institutional framework in Argentina.  This framework is tied to 
the impact of the democratic electoral process and the unintended consequences of populist 
policies.  Richardson argues that Argentine agricultura  producers have had diminished political 
power and influence needed to affect policies since the rise of Populism.  This has been a 
constraint since the beginning of the populist movement in 1947 and through successive 
populist governments in 1955, 1973, and 2001.  However, this complete lack of political 
influence reached its nadir in 2003 with the election of the Kirchner administrations.  One of the 
key factors in this phenomenon has been the ability to assign levels of taxation based on the 
political expediencies of the electoral process.  This has been coupled with the limited capacity 
(or lack of capacity) for agricultural producers in Argentina to form strong political 
organizations (Richardson, 2012, p. 138).  Although much of the recent research on economic 




as oil, copper, and diamonds, Richardson’s analysis rightly shows how agricultural commodities 
can similarly shape political economics and trade policies (Richardson, 2012, p. 146). 
There is also an argument that Populism and increased government control have been 
good for the economy.  These scholars contend that soybeans have surged as a crop production 
system because the government has pursued policies that have correctly created incentives to 
keep agricultural commodities used as food for domestic consumption (Richardson, 2008, p. 
253).  Historically, Argentina’s main exports have been beef and wheat.  These commodities are 
also the primary commodities for consumption by the population of Argentina.  Because 
soybeans are not consumed domestically, the Kirchne administration could promote and tax 
their export without causing any domestic issues.  At the same time, they could restrict the 
export of wheat and beef in order to protect domestic supply.  This policy framework has 
allowed Argentina to expropriate rents from the global boom in agricultural commodities and to 
generate fiscal revenue through soybean exports while protecting its citizens from increased 
prices for food (Richardson, 2008, p. 254).   
How a country’s government manages its monetary policy can also have serious 
consequences for industry and in particular an agricultural industry focused on export markets.  
Richardson analyzed the impact monetary policies imple ented by various governments can 
have on the efficiency and competitiveness of agricultural producers.  When a currency is kept 
at undervalued rates, input costs for producers are higher due to the pressure of inflation.  In 
other words, in addition to import tariffs, the price of imported seed, fertilizer, fuel, and 
equipment is higher due to the exchange rates.  These factors drive the cost of production 




The Argentine central bank, at the direction of the Kirchner government, has heavily 
intervened in the foreign exchange markets, preventing the peso from appreciating in value 
(Richardson, 2009).  In order to maintain the advantages of the undervalued peso, the Argentine 
central bank made a policy of buying incoming foreign currency (dollars), printing pesos, and 
keeping export manufacturing at a competitive advantage.  This greatly stimulated the money 
supply and the ability of domestic companies to produce products (Gallo, 2012, p. 57).  This 
stimulation has also caused a significant rise of overall inflation in the economy.   
The official interest rates published by the Argentine government are seriously 
understated.  While the government’s official statitics agency claims inflation is under 10 
percent, private economists estimate it to be running at nearly 25 percent (Stewart, 2011).  
Meanwhile, to avoid international scrutiny, the Argentine government has refused to allow 
economists from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to audit its accounts, despite that 
review being required of all IMF member states.  (Stewart, 2011).  Because the government’s 
official figures are debatable, the Economist magazine has stopped publishing the government’s 
official figures due to the unreliability of the data (Economist, 2012).  As mentioned above, this 
high inflation has meant that production costs for farmers have continued to rise while the price 
realization for commodities produced have been limited by internal price controls as well as by 
external market forces.    As the trade surplus in Argentina dwindled, the Kirchner government 
has continued to reinforce extractionary tax policies.    
More recent rulings by the government are likely to further erode confidence in the 
government and have impacts on agricultural producers.  One example of these policies is a 
trade balancing scheme implemented by the government called the “Company Specific Trade 




Argentina that they import into the country.  This forces companies to make decisions on what 
products they will produce in order to balance imports and exports rather than on where they 
can most efficiently produce those products. 
The trade policies of the Kirchners have systematically raised the price of domestically 
produced goods as well as the imported goods.  It is precisely the aim of import taxes and 
quotas to raise the profitability of domestic production of previously imported goods.  This 
allows the local manufacturers to maintain a higher price without competition, regardless of 
whether they offer a better product or service (Ground, 2012, p. 2).  As mentioned earlier, a 
secondary impact on agriculture of raising the prices for imports and import substitutes is that it 
also appreciates the foreign exchange rate.  As far back as the 1930s, economists have 
recognized the potential negative impacts of import and export taxes on productive industries.  
A.P. Lerner published a study in 1936 that theorized the effect of tariffs on relative prices is the 
same regardless of which policy (import tariffs or export taxes) is applied.  By putting tariffs on 
imports, the government in effect is also effectively taxing exports.  This is because by raising 
the prices of imports and import substitutes through import taxes, the effect is to appreciate the 
value of the domestic currency, in this case the peso (Lerner, 1936, p. 307).  By appreciating the 
currency, import taxes are effectively raising the price of exports and thereby reducing their 
international competitiveness.  This is why an import tax is equivalent to a tax on commodity 
exports.   
Studies related to the total productivity performance of Argentinean agriculture have 
been mixed in their assessments of how the trade policies have impacted agricultural 
production.  Some have maintained that the policies have actually helped agriculture by forcing 




(Richardson, 2009, p. 231).  However, according to Lence, the experience from the period 1990 
to 2001, when import substitution policies reached the lowest level in decades, strongly 
suggests that the sector is extremely responsive to economic incentives, both positive and 
negative.  This responsiveness has allowed the agricultural industry to adapt to the incentives 
imposed by government.  In other words, the industry has managed to continue in spite of the 
trade policies, not because of them (Lence, 2010).  Brambilla argues further that these 
incentives have negatively impacted the agricultural industry by forcing production changes.  
He demonstrates the impacts through an analysis of the annual rates for export taxation.  The 
average export taxes applied to Argentine exports th ough the period 1965 to 2010 are on the 
chart below. 
Figure 6 - Argentina Export Tax Rates, 1965-2011  
 
(Brambilla, Galiani, & Porto, June 2011, p. 32) 
The most striking difference in these trade policy trends occurred in the 1990s and is 
consistent with the liberalization associated with the administration of President Menem (1989-
1999).  Unfortunately, this period and administration was also known for corruption, bribery 














































































































and trade liberalization freed the agriculture industry to make decisions on the basis of 
efficiency and market conditions rather than making decisions due to tariff rates.  During the 
periods of reduced export taxation, Argentine producers rapidly adopted new cropping 
technologies and expanded their soybean acreage in production.  There were significant shifts to 
more productive cropping practices and crops.  The economic crisis of 2001 and the need for 
the government to improve its fiscal revenues led to a reversal in the liberal policies that had 
begun to help improve the health of the agricultura sector (Lence, 2010).  The trade 
liberalization period ended with the Kirchner administration in 2003 and export taxes were 
again actively used as industrial policy (Brambilla, Galiani, & Porto, June 2011, p. 13).   
The tendency to pursue extractive trade policies demonstrated by the Kirchner 
administrations is beginning to have serious impacts on the agricultural economy in Argentina.  
The Crop Site published a study in April 2012 on the impact of the export controls imposed by 
the Argentine government.  It shows that for the past several years, Argentine farmers have been 
impacted by government controlled commodity export limits (5M Publishing, 2012).  These 
export limits, coupled with the increasingly significant export taxes, have further discouraged 
overseas sales.  The government argues that these controls are necessary to protect domestic 
food prices.  As a consequence, with one product as an example, wheat producers have become 
discouraged as the government has attempted to control the price of bread in order to keep the 
domestic market well supplied.  When a producer does not earn enough to cover the cost of 
production it will discourage production.  As a consequence, Argentina’s farmers are sowing 
the least amount of land in wheat as they have since 1979.  This is an area that should be a 
breadbasket for the Argentine nation and the world (5M Publishing, 2012).  This is an example 




produced within the Total Agriculture Production.  On the other hand, soybean products have 
benefited from the fact that they are not directly a food staple in Argentina and have thus been 
spared from the export limits.  The government has w rped the incentives structure for the 
agricultural producers in favor of soybeans.  It has in turn taxed these exports accordingly. 
The combination of direct taxation on imports and the indirect taxation on ag exports 
through import taxes on inputs, coupled with putting actual export taxes on commodities have 
had detrimental effects on the Argentine economy overall.  Ground predicts that these policies, 
over time, will lead to recurring balance of payment, fiscal and debt crises and force periodic 
and costly adjustment (Ground, 2012, p. 3).   The protectionist trade policies pursued by the 
Kirchner regime should cause agricultural output to stagnate or contract.  The profitability of 
exportable commodities is squeezed by both the import tax on inbound manufactured products, 
the effect of the import tax on the exchange rate (pushing the value up), and by the export taxes 
on the exported agricultural products.  The net effect should be that these policies should lead to 
economic stagnation and decline (Ground, 2012, p. 5). 
However, Argentine farmers have managed to increase their output of large grains and 
are the third largest producers of soybeans in the world.  This outcome is puzzling.  W. D. 
Reeder asserts that the global commodities boom, coupled with the currency devaluation as well 
as keeping the currency undervalued have been enough stimuli and have helped overcome the 
negative challenges faced by agricultural producers.  Although the export taxes on agricultural 
commodities have certainly had negative impacts on agricultural production, the 60% currency 
devaluation had a larger impact on the ability of Argentina’s farmers to produce and export 
soybeans.  The devaluation made Argentine exports more competitively priced on the 




The distortional impact of tax and trade policies on crop production can be particularly 
detrimental to poorer, developing countries by reducing their ability to compete in international 
markets (Rakotoarisoa, 2010).    Rakotoarisoa did a relevant study of this phenomenon on rice 
production.  Although this is a different crop than I am investigating, the model he developed is 
still applicable.  His model shows that high levels taxation of rice in poorer, developing 
countries actually widens the gap in production betwe n those countries and more economically 
developed countries with the same crops.  This is epecially true when comparing to countries 
that support their own crop production through subsidie  and protection (Rakotoarisoa, 2010).  
Fulginiti and Perrin did a different study in 1997 to examine agricultural productivity change in 
eighteen countries, including Argentina, for the period 1961-1985.  They were analyzing the 
impact of tax and trade policies and estimated that agricultural productivity fell -4.8% in 
Argentina due to the government’s tax and trade policies.  In their analysis, the authors argued 
that a lack of investment leading to technological regression was largely responsible for the 
productivity decline. (Fulginiti & Perrin, 1997)  Their analysis ended in 1985.  I will be looking 
at similar data from 1985 through the more liberalized trading regime of the 1990s and through 
2013. 
There has also been some regional analysis of changes i  agricultural production.  The 
agricultural productivity of Brazil has continued to show improvement and has been to subject 
of extensive analysis.  One such study by Helfand and de Rezende shows relative total 
agricultural production of Brazil was higher compared to the other countries in Latin America 
(Helfand & de Rezende, 2002).  Another regional study on Paraguay investigated agricultural 
productivity growth rates from 1970 into the early 2000s and showed that total productivity has 




until 1989 and was subject to significant political, social, and economic instability.  This study 
focused on the technical as well as scale efficiencies of agricultural producers. (Fletschner & 
Zepeda, 2002).  Although Uruguay is the smallest country in MERCUSUR and unable to take 
advantage of economies of scale, it is still primarly dependent on agricultural production for its 
GDP and the total agricultural production levels have been relatively stagnant throughout the 
1990s.  Hudson and Meditz attribute this slow growth rate to the inconsistency of state policies 
toward the agricultural industry.  They also point to he very slow adoption rates for new 
technology among the producers (Hudson & Meditz, 1992).  Chile, an associate member of 
Mercosur since 1995, has also seen a surge in its agr cultural productivity, especially in exports 
like fruit and wine.  Much of this growth can be attributable to land reform and privatization 
along with the Chilean government’s investment in infrastructure.  These changes have received 
a big boost through the implementation of market oriented policies by the Chilean government. 
(De Janvry, Key, & Sadoulet, 1997) 
A factor that complicates our understanding the truimpact of trade policies on 
agricultural production is the complexity of data as crop production systems change over time 
with the development of new technologies such as genetically modified (GM) seed.  Prior to the 
mid-1970s, Argentina was not a primary producer of soybean products.  Today, Argentina is the 
third largest producer of soy with a 17% share of wrld product.  Some authors have suggested 
that the dramatic growth of soybean production in Argentina (as well as in Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay) is the result of better technology.  The combination of direct seeding, inorganic 
fertilization, efficient mechanical harvesting, and the herbicide-resistant GM soybean has made 
the crop production system more technically and economically efficient. (Ministry of 




Economic Research Service (USDA ERS) has also suggeted that the growth in soy production 
is due to Argentina having an absolute comparative advantage.  The ERS has conducted 
research on production costs that supports the comparative advantage argument. (Schnepf, 
Dohlman, & Bolling, 2001, pp. 53-60)   However, the limitation in these analyses by both the 
ERS and the Ministry of Agriculture is that although Argentina has comparative advantage for 
the production of soybeans and soybean-based products, this attribute does not fully explain 
Argentina’s move away from other crops.  In particular, those crops and commodities that are 





CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY  
The purpose for this chapter is to describe the methodological approach I have used for 
this research.  The goal of the research is develop a better understanding of what, if any, impact 
the trade and monetary policies employed by the Argentine government have had on 
agricultural production or on agricultural investment at the producer level.  Given the primary 
objectives of the research and the datasets available for analysis, I have employed a combination 
of case study and quantitative analysis to the resea ch.  The methodology includes analysis of 
data obtained from the USDA (US Department of Agriculture), INTA (Argentina National 
Institute of Agriculture Technology), FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), The World 
Bank, and Index Mundi to develop applicable annualized data useful for time series quantitative 
comparison. 
The approach to this empirical research is a historical case study.  I believe that the 
Argentine agricultural economic challenges are bestexplained with analysis of long-run 
historical data and comparing year over year changes in the data to changes in the policy 
environment during the same period to confirm or deny an impact of those polices.  Isolating for 
aggressive trade and monetary policies and programs provides a more refined comparison and 
allows us to test the effects of rules and governance on agricultural economic circumstances.   
To compare the effects of the trade and monetary policies, I have used annual data for 
the years 1975 through 2012.  One of the major challenges has been getting data that are 
complete and consistent for the entire period.  This study focuses on grain production (wheat, 
corn, soybean) and is heavily concentrated in the central-eastern region of Argentina known as 
the Pampas, one of the most productive agricultural areas in the world and one that is of major 




Wheat and corn have been the principal crops in the region for the last 100 years with soybean 
and soy products being a much more recent addition.   Agriculture has always been a key 
contributor to the Argentine GDP.  In the chart below, this contribution has ranged from 4.4% 
to 11.0% of GDP.  As the contribution of soy products on the chart shows, even as recently as 
1980, soybeans represented only 15% of agricultural production in Argentina.  However, 
soybeans now represent more than 66% of the Total Agricultural Production (TAP).  This 
dependence on a single crop may create problems with maintaining the level of production. 
Figure 7 - Agriculture Contribution to GDP / Soy vs. Food Production, 1980-2013  
 
(Calculated from World Bank Data, 2014 and John Deere EMR, 2014) 
The crop production systems historically characteris ic for the Pampas area include corn 
and soybean rotation and wheat-soybean double crops.  Thi  crop rotation cycle allows the soil 
to remain vibrant and fertile and ultimately reduces the need for fertilization.  The Pampas 
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modern inputs and technological knowledge) which makes it comparable, for example, with the 
American “Corn Belt”.  
In compiling the data for analysis, I employ both official statistics on production and 
governmental financial indicators as well as data from the agricultural sector.  Previous studies 
have used Total Crop Value and Agricultural Contribution to the Argentina GDP, however, this 
may hide some of the negative effects of domestic poli ies on agriculture.  To fully understand 
and investigate the impacts of the policies, we need to examine more localized, micro 
production data.  I have reviewed various ways to quantify the impact of the trade and monetary 
policies pursued by the Argentine government during the period 1975-2012.  The first and most 
obvious would be to measure changes in the level of production that farmers have been able to 
attain over time with changes in trade policies.  The expectation from this approach would be 
for the macro data to reflect the impacts of the policies.  However, the broad indicators like 
Total Crop Value and the Agriculture Share of GDP have continued to rise even when most free 
market economists would have forecasted a diminishig level of total production due to the 
reduced level of incentive for the producers.  This would seem to indicate that either the policies 
had no impact, that the effects of the policies are manifesting themselves at another level, or the 
impacts will show up later in time.  Therefore, a different analysis is required to understand the 
implications.   
The approach I have selected is to analyze underlying agricultural data for potential 
impacts using two methods.  1) The first is to analyze the correlation between trade policies and 
the commodity mix in production to understand if the rade policies are affecting commodity 
production decisions by farmers.  The data I have used to analyze this is Export Tax rates 




approach to the data is to analyze the relationship between trade policies and the level of 
agricultural investment by producers.  The data for this analysis is Capital Investment, Land 
Investment, and Equipment Investment in correlation to Export Taxation.   
There are several datasets I have reviewed and compiled for the analysis.  The table 
below shows the type of data along with the data source and a description of the data elements.  
Figure 8 - Data Sets and Definitions 
Data Type Source Description 
Agricultural Share of 
Exports 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Agricultural raw materials comprise 
crude commodities and materials 
except fuels and exclude crude 
fertilizers and minerals. 




Agriculture, value added (% of GDP); 
Includes forestry and cultivation of 
crops and livestock production. Value 
added is the net output of a sector after 
adding up all outputs and subtracting 
intermediate inputs. 
Arable land (hectares) World Bank Agricultural Data 
Arable land includes land under crops, 
meadows for pasture, and land 
temporarily fallow. Land abandoned as 
a result of shifting cultivation is 
excluded. 
Crop Production Index 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Crop production index shows 
agricultural production for each year 
relative to the base period 2004-2006. 
It includes all crops except fodder 
crops.  
Crop Value - Corn 
Data Source:  John Deere Enterprise 
Market Research 
Calculated.   
Crop Value - Soybeans 
Data Source:  John Deere Enterprise 
Market Research 
Calculated from Data Edge historic 
database, 2012 
Crop Value - Wheat 
Data Source:  John Deere Enterprise 
Market Research 
Calculated.   
Export Tax 
Argentine Trade Policies in the XX 
Century:  60 Years of Solitude; 
Brambilla/Galiani/Porto; Pages 32-35 
Average Tax on Exports (% ad 
valorem) 
Fertilizer consumption 
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
statistical database 
Annual Consumption in Tons.  
Fertilizer products cover nitrogenous, 
potash, and phosphate fertilizers.  
Traditional nutrients--animal and plant 
manures--are not included. 
Fertilizer consumption 
per hectare of land in 
World Bank Agricultural Data; FAO Data; 
Calculated from Tons to KG per Hectare 
Fertilizer consumption measures the 




production unit of arable land.   
Food production index 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
2004-2006 = 100.  Food production 
index covers food crops that are 
considered edible and that contain 
nutrients. Coffee and tea are excluded 
because, although edible, they have no 
nutritive value. 
Food production per 
capita 
Calculated from Data at  John Deere 
Enterprise Market Research & the World 
Bank 
Using the combination of crop 
production values for Corn, Wheat, 
Barley, and Rice.  These are primary 
products for food consumption for 
people.  Divided by Total Population. 
GDP Per Capita 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
This is GDP divided by the midyear 




World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the 
economy.  The data is in current U.S. 
dollars.  The dollar figures for GDP 
were converted single year official 
exchange rates.  
Land Development 
Investment 
FAO statistical database 




FAO statistical database 
Constant 2005 prices, US Dollars 
(millions) 
Population 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
  
Tariff rate, Imports 
World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Weighted mean, all products (%); This 
is the average of applied rates 
weighted by the product import shares.  
Tariff line data were matched to 
Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC) revision 3 codes 




FAO statistical database 
Constant 2005 prices, US Dollars 
(millions) 
Total Crop Value 
Data Source:  Calculated from Data Edge 
historic database, 2012 (John Deere 
Enterprise Market Research) 
Measured in US dollars.  This is a 
measure of the total value of crop 
production used to generate revenue 
by agricultural producers.  This is a 
proxy for Gross Farm Revenue (GFR).  
 
Once I had gathered the data from the various sources and formatted them for analysis, I 
used SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists) o help refine the statistical relationships 




taxation on exports as a proxy for aggressive and extractionary trade policies that could have 
impacts on agricultural production.  The focus is to identify periods when Argentina has had 
higher than average tariffs, has had incentives on domestic industrial production, has 
implemented quotas on imported goods, and / or has levied taxes on exports.  The theory is that 
these would be primary indicators of extractive trade policies aimed at supporting domestic 
production and leveraging the value of agricultural production.  I have chosen the average 
annual export taxation value as a proxy for these policies.   
Hypothesis one is that with higher levels of export taxation results in lower crop 
production values.  The higher levels of export taxa ion coupled with export quotas have also 
negatively impacted food production in Argentina.  Using the level of export taxation as the 
independent variable, the following disaggregated commodities are the dependent variables. 
• Crop Production Index 
• Crop Value - Wheat  
• Crop Value - Corn  
• Crop Value - Soybeans  
• Food Production Index 
• Food Production per Capita 
 With this analysis, I will be looking for a correlation between export taxation and the 
make-up of the commodities produced and the affect these policies may have had on the level of 
production of commodities that are primarily for human consumption. 
Hypothesis two is that higher levels of export tax results in lower levels of capital 
investment in production agriculture.  The theory is that if the state is taking a portion of the 
revenue from agricultural exports and the market con rols the price available to the farmer, the 
impact of the tax is directly on the farmer.  Does thi extractionary tax affect investment 
decisions the producers are making?  Will these decisions impact the ability of the producers to 




Revenue).  Using the following dependent variables, I xpect to find a correlation between 
agricultural producer revenue and the investment of resources by agricultural producers that will 
likely have longer term impacts on Argentina’s ability to produce agricultural products. 
Using the level of export taxation as the independent variable, the dependent variables 
for this analysis are the aggregate values of the following: 
• Total Crop Value 
• Total Capital Investment 
• Land Development Investment  
• Machinery and Ag Equipment Investment 
• Fertilizer Consumption 
• Arable land (hectares) 
• Fertilizer consumption per hectare of land in production 
 
In addition to data analysis, I had a few of informal conversations with people in and 
around the agricultural industry in Argentina, primarily people that I am associated with through 
my work with John Deere.  The primary purpose for these interviews / conversations is to add 
some richness in perspective from those people mostaffected by the trends in the data and add 
some level of understanding for how people affected by the changes perceive the trends seen in 
the data.  I will cite my conversations with those individuals as anecdotal references in the 




CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS & ANALYSIS  
Regardless of what a policy is intended to do by the government that is implementing 
the policy, bad policies usually have bad results.  The case of Argentine policies and their 
impacts on the Argentine agricultural industry is no exception.  While the effects of the tax 
regime implemented in Argentina are not readily apparent in the macro economic data, we can 
see their long term effects in the changing structure of the agricultural sector.  Some of the 
effects are found in the lower sophistication of agricultural practices by Argentine producers in 
comparison with producers in other countries with similar natural advantages.  The impacts 
materialize in the value of land, the agricultural investment other than land (permanent silos, 
irrigation, tiling), and the changing make-up of the commodities produced. 
Although a cursory review of the economic data for Argentina shows continued growth 
in the major economic indicators like GDP and Total Crop Value, Argentina’s economy has 
declined in real terms since 1990.   Figure 9 below shows the evolution of some of the key 
economic and agricultural indicators for Argentina since 1975.  It appears from each of the main 
economic indicators that Argentina is doing very well, with a growing GDP and per capita 
GDP.  However, to fully understand the economic situat on and the changes that are occurring 
requires a more in-depth look.  
Figure 9 - Key Economic Indicators, Argentina, 1975-2012 
 
2Footnote3 




 Data for population and GDP figures compiled from World Bank World Development Indicators;  Crop Value is 
from John Deere Enterprise Market Research;  Ag Share of GDP and Exports is from EconStats 
1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-24 2005-2009 2010-2012
Population 26,887,709        28,996,259        31,255,006        33,516,432        35,682,383        37,616,633        39,333,572        40,729,963          
GDP (000) $57,544,869 $84,603,472 $102,660,204 $210,809,061 $281,102,350 $187,533,490 $258,353,247 $430,093,960
GDP Per Capita $2,137 $2,916 $3,287 $6,270 $7,875 $5,006 $6,553 $10,553
Total Crop Value 
(Annual Avg, 000)
$6,344,636 $5,117,374 $6,691,319 $9,715,398 $12,450,029$24,000,579 $39,810,925
Ag Share of GDP 7.6% 7.9% 8.4% 6.4% 5.5% 8.4% 8.7% 8.2%




For example, the data in Figure 9 does not account f r the negative and corrosive effects 
of inflation.  Unfortunately, the Argentine government has decided not to report the data that 
would allow The World Bank to publish these statistics.  Officially, the inflation rates in 
Argentina have averaged 8-10%.  Unofficially, and more accurately, the latest estimates put the 
annual inflation rates at around 35% per year (Romig, 2014).   
In addition to reviewing the data specific to Argentina, I have also considered this 
macro-economic data in comparison to other nations with similar development.  For example, in 
the chart below, we are comparing the per capita GDP growth of Argentina to the other nations 
in the southern cone of Latin America.  The per capita GDP for Argentina has grown at the 
same rate as the other countries.  
Figure 10 - Comparison:  Southern Cone Per Capita GDP
 
(Calculated from World Bank Data, 2014) 
A macroeconomic measure similar to GDP but specific to the agricultural industry is the 
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output of all agricultural production in a country.  As shown in the chart below and similar to 
GDP and per Capita GDP, Total Crop Value also appears to have grown remarkably well.   
Figure 11 – Total Crop Value of Production, Argentina, 2000-2013 
 
(John Deere EMR, 2014) 
According to both John Deere Enterprise Market Research and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization Data Service, total agricultural production in Argentina has increased since 2000.  
However, it is the changes within the makeup of the agricultural industry and the crop practices 
adopted by the producer farmers that is troubling.  The overall efficiency of agricultural 
production in Argentina continues to decline relative to the country’s capability and 
comparative advantage.  Even though the production of soybeans has climbed over the past 
decade, other crop production, specifically commodities for human consumption, have been 
declining.  The chart below shows the changes in per capita production of products more closely 
associated with human consumption, corn and wheat.  The implications are clear that the 
production value of both of these commodities has declined during the same period that total 
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Figure 12 – Corn & Wheat Production per Capita, Argentina, 2000-2013 
 
(John Deere EMR, 2014) 
Understanding why this change is occurring also requi s an understanding of the 
market forces outside of Argentina and how these factors might be affecting commodity mix.  Is 
it possible that the farmers in Argentina were making rational choices in response to changes in 
international market prices?  To answer that question requires a review of the market prices for 
wheat during the period 2000-2013.  The chart below shows the annual international wheat 
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Figure 13 – International Wheat Prices, 2000
The data along with the level of wheat production fr the other primary wheat 
countries during the same period both suggest that w eat farmers have been changing crop mix 
due to domestic policies and not international market conditions.
level of production for the leading global wheat producers.
producer’s trend lines show increased production during the period.  Argentina is the exception 
with a declining level of production.
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Figure 14 – Wheat Production Levels, 2000-2013 
 
(Calculated from data at Food and Agriculture Organiz tion of the United Nations, 2014) 
As with other economic data, it is helpful to compare the production results for 
Argentina relative to the other nations with similar agricultural practices and potential during 
the same period of development.  The chart below demonstrates the change in total crop 
production since 2000 and compares the production in Argentina to that of Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, and Chile.  This is an index measure that compares total crop production within a 
country with the average for that country set to a baseline period of the years 2004 through 
2006.  In 2000, Argentina’s Crop Production Index was closest to Chile and among the highest 
in the region.  By 2011, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil had surpassed both Argentina and Chile.  
Due to structural reforms in their domestic policies, Chile’s current trend line is more positive 
than Argentina’s.  It is clear that the production of agriculture overall has diminished relative to 
the gains made by the other nations in the region. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
China 99.64 93.87 90.29 86.49 91.95 97.45 108.47 109.30 112.46 115.12 115.19 117.41 121.03 121.73 
India 76.37 69.68 72.77 65.76 72.16 68.64 69.35 75.81 78.57 80.68 80.80 86.87 94.88 93.51 
United States 60.64 53.00 43.70 63.80 58.70 57.24 49.22 55.82 68.02 60.37 60.06 54.41 61.68 57.97 
Russia 34.46 46.98 50.61 34.10 45.41 47.70 44.93 49.37 63.77 61.74 41.51 56.24 37.72 52.09 
France 37.35 31.54 38.94 30.47 39.69 36.89 35.36 32.76 39.01 38.33 38.21 35.99 40.30 38.61 









Five Largest Wheat Producing Countries




Figure 15 - Crop Production Index, MERCUSUR, 2004-206 
m, 
(Calculated from data at Food and Agriculture Organiz tion of the United Nations, 2014) 
Some of the consequences of the policies pursued by Argentina since 2003 can be seen 
in the lower investment in permanent infrastructure projects by agricultural producers.  One 
such activity has been the development and use of ag bags for the storage of grains rather than 
permanent silos.  The financial crisis in 2001 compunded already chronic underinvestment in 
Argentina’s agricultural infrastructure.  Silos were in short supply and the financial means to 
build more were limited. Without enough silos, farmers could not store their harvested crop. If 
market prices at harvest are low, without storage, th  farmers cannot wait for the prices to 
improve.  As a consequence, Argentina has developed an entire supporting industry around the 
use of infield, on ground, grain storage.  In circumstances that producers in similar conditions in 
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and the equipment to support these activities.  Thecost to invest in ag bags is roughly a third of 
the cost to build permanent silos.  Silo bags are made of strong, durable fibers and can hold up 
to 20 tons of soybeans in each. At harvest, a special machine would fill the bags in the field, 
where they could be left lying horizontally for up to five months.  Silo bags had only a tenth of 
the storage capacity of most silos, but they were cheap, easy to use, and allowed producers to 
store their crops until prices improved or when trasportation was more readily available.  This 
suggests that the confiscatory policies of the governm nt that the agricultural producers in 
Argentina have much less incentive or resources to invest in more expensive infrastructure 
projects, like permanent storage capability. 
How is it possible that polices that are this distortionary have continued to be 
implemented?  It is partly due to the unique features of the agricultural sector that have allowed 
the highly distortionary export tax structure to remain in place.  It is unique to agricultural that 
the effects produced by the extractionary taxes do not always show in the average macro 
indicators.  This uniqueness also helps explain the a tractiveness of taxing the expansion of the 
soybean industry to the politicians within the Argentine government.  It has been very fortunate 
for Argentina that production efficiency has been exploding at a time of increasing international 
demand for a product (soybeans) that has very little use in the domestic Argentine marketplace.  
Apparently to the Argentine political elite, the taxes applied to the export of soy products only 
affect the windfall gains of agricultural producers.  They appear superficially to have no direct 
cost to Argentine society as a whole. 
It is also clear from the data that overall crop production in Argentina has changed 
significantly since 1980, both in the quantity of the production and in the mix of commodities 
produced.  While the total production has grown steadily, there have been significant changes in 
 
the makeup of individual commodities within the total
to the government’s taxation policies
growth of soybean production and the 
consumption.  The pie charts below show the changing makeup of the major commodity crops 
in Argentina for 1980, 1996, and 2013.
Figure 16 - Changing Commodity Production, 1980
In 1980, corn and wheat production made up 49% of total agricultural production.  Per 
capita wheat consumption used for 
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.  The most significant of these changes has been the 




(IHS Global Insight, 2014)
bread, which averaged 111 kilograms per capita p




























income economies ranked higher in consumption (Calcul ted from data at Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2014).  Soybeans were only 15% of the total in 1980.  Even 
as recently as 1996, corn and wheat made up 47%.  Soybeans production was expanding and by 
1996 made up 30% of the Total Agricultural Production, displacing sugar and sorghum.   
Argentina agriculture adapted well to soybean production because it was profitable, 
grew well in the Pampas, and has been an excellent rotational crop to corn and wheat.  The 
impact of GM seed also dramatically reduced the input costs and increased the production value 
of soybean products.  Argentine agriculture was developing with good balance and was not 
dependent on any single commodity.  This all changed under the Kirchner leadership and 
policies.  The evolving pattern in crop output has been induced by the changing incentives for 
producers.  These changing incentives have been caused by a combination of developing 
international market conditions with increasing market demand for the product.  By 2013, more 
than half of the arable land and 66% of the total crop production in Argentina was dedicated to 
soybeans.   
In comparison to other leading wheat producers in the Western Hemisphere, this has 
been a dramatic change toward soybean production.  The charts below show the mix of the 
primary crops for the other wheat producing nations, Brazil, Paraguay, Canada, and the US.  
While the mix has changed in favor of producing more soybeans, the change from 18% to 25% 
soy production is not exceptional.  Corn production also went up from 54% to 60% in 2013.  
The percentage of wheat production has gone down compared to the other crops; however, the 
actual production by tonnage has remained nearly constant in these four countries.  It remained 
constant in those countries while wheat production in Argentina went down by nearly half 
during the same period. 
 
Figure 17 - Commodity Production, 
 
Another influence on farmer’s crop decisions in addition to domestic policies has been 
technology advances.  The major technological change 
soybean production was the introduction of G
soybean seeds that were resistant to weed treatments (like Monsanto’s glyphosate, trade name 
Roundup) proved to be hugely popular among producers.  
with the name “Roundup Ready”.  
Argentine producers, Argentina has consistently ranked second in the world (after the United 











(IHS Global Insight, 2014)
driving much of the expansion of 
enetically Modified (GM) seed by Monsan
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Notably, because of the popularity of this technology for 






















The adoption of GM seeds has contributed to the expansion of agricultural production in 
Argentina in several ways.  First, GM seed allowed the farmer to apply weed treatments when 
they are most effective at weed control and to adopt c st saving techniques like zero tillage.   
Zero tillage, or no-till, consists of planting crops in soil without previous tillage, by opening 
only a slot in the soil with the smallest dimension to get the seed planted.  Zero tillage 
eliminates the need to till the soil and perform other types of work associated with conventional 
crop production technologies.  Second, zero tillage llows poorer, less productive, land to come 
into production, contributing to the expansion of the crop frontier.  Third, zero tillage reduces 
the deterioration of land caused by tillage.  This ha permitted the conversion of some areas that 
were on rotation between pasture and crop to permanent (monoculture) agriculture.  With the 
traditional tillage techniques used for weed control, pasture rotations were required in order to 
maintain the fertility of the land (Lence, 2010, p. 429). 
The desirable attributes of GM seed coupled with domestic agricultural and trade 
policies that penalized farmers for producing almost any crop other than soybeans have 
contributed to the focus on soy production in Argentina.  From a nonexistent product in 1970 to 
today, Argentina has become the third largest producer of soybeans in the world, with 19.3% of 
the global supply. 
As shown in Table 18, between 2005 and 2011, Argentina produced 8.4% of world 
agricultural output and accounted for 2.9% of world agricultural trade.  This makes Argentina 
the eighth-largest producer and the twelfth largest exporter of agricultural commodities in the 
world.  However, what would explain the difference between the amount of production and the 
export ratio?  Why would Argentina have such a much smaller share of world exports (2.9%) 




commodities with relatively low value-added qualities.  Argentina exports basic commodities 
like soybeans and associated products, soybean oil d soybean meal. Argentina is the top 
exporter of soybean oil and soybean meal, with 46.9% and 36.1% of the world’s export market, 
and the third-largest exporter of soybeans. For all three commodities, Argentina ranks third 
among all producers, with almost one-fifth of world output.  The result is that Argentina has 
become overly dependent on a single commodity with low value added processes.  This may 
become a serious issue when commodity prices moderate in the international markets or when 
the production gains from soybeans moderate.  
Table 18 - Argentina’s production and exports of select d ag commodities, avg. 2005-2011 
World Share (%) World Ranking World Share (%) World Ranking
Total agricultural Products 8.4 8 2.9 12
Crops:
Soybeans 19.3 3 13.7 3
Soybean Meal 17.4 3 36.1 1
Soybean Oil 17.4 3 46.9 1
Wheat 2.4 13 6.7 7
Production Exports
 
(Calculated from data at Food and Agriculture Organiz tion of the United Nations, 2014) 
The decade of the 2000s has been very favorable for Argentina’s agricultural exports 
and has expanded tax revenues for the state.  Ultimately, high international commodity prices 
have allowed the Argentine government to avoid increases in domestic commodity prices.  
Dependence on this rising agricultural market has led the government to apply ever higher 
export taxes.  The need to protect the domestic market in order to keep prices low led to export 
restrictions or export bans on certain commodity exports.  This policy was intended to keep the 
domestic supply large enough that prices would remain low.  For wheat and corn, the 
government implemented a complex compensation scheme to allow domestic users to buy at 
more favorable prices than exporters (Lence, 2010, p. 423).  As for soybeans and soy products, 
although the government taxed the exports (as high as 37.5% in 2007), since the products are 
 
barely consumed by the Argentine domestic market
export.  Instead, high international market prices have allowed the government to extract the tax 
while production continued to expand due to improved efficiencies
pushed farmers to move away from 
There are serious potential consequences with the direction of Argentine agriculture.  
Another view of the changes taking place in the agricultural industry is to compare Total 
Agricultural Production (TAP) changes over time.  The chart below shows the TAP (Gray 
along with the contributions of soy and food products over time.  The black triangles show the 
percentage of food production and the yellow line is the soy contribution.  The linear trend lines 
clearly indicate the move away from food production in A
Figure 19 - Argentina Agricultural Production Changes, 1990
Another method for reviewing the data is to compare the production figures on a per 
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population in Argentina.   The per capita food production in Argentina has clearly diminished 
over the last two decades, with the trend line for the data showing a steep decline. 
Figure 20 - Argentina Per Captia Food Production, Argentina, 2000-2012 
 
(John Deere EMR, 2014) 
There are also potential environmental impacts created by the changing crop production 
practices and the move toward more soybean production.  The focus on soybean production has 
led to monocropping.  This is where the farmer plants soybean year over year on the same 
acreage.  According to Pengue, large scale mechanized GM soy monocropping in the Pampas 
has resulted in nutrient depletion and soil structure degradation.  There is also the potential for 
significant environmental impact due to large scale soybean monocropping. As monocrops 
expand into frontier areas, natural habitats disappe r, thus endangering plant and animal 
biodiversity (Pengue, 2009). 
Wheat production clearly demonstrates the impact of export taxes and export quotas 
coupled with import substitution policies.  For the past several years, Argentine farmers have 
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government says are to protect domestic supply.  As a consequence, wheat producers have 
become discouraged as the government has attempted to control the wheat market in order to 
keep the domestic market well supplied and prices low.  This has given farmers little incentive 
to produce wheat and so they have slashed the land sown with wheat in 2014 to the lowest level 
since 1903, when pioneers were still expanding the frontier.  Even since 1990, wheat production 
has decreased from $24,942 per capita to $13,032 in 2012, a reduction of almost half.  If 
weather does not cooperate, one of the world's natural breadbaskets may not produce enough 
wheat next year to meet domestic demand.  If it falls short of wheat, it would be only the second 
time since the 1870s that Argentine farmers could not supply enough wheat for their own 
market.  Argentina could realistically supply three times the domestic requirements and yet still 
produce the same amount (or more) in soybeans as tod y.  The Pampas should be a breadbasket 
for the Argentine nation and the world. (The Economist, 2013)   
A quantitative review of the data confirms the correlation between the level of export 
taxation and the level of wheat production.  Pearson's r) is a measure of the linear correlation 
(dependence) between a set of two variables.  The corr lation analysis results in a range of 
values between 1 and negative 1.  A value of 1 is a total positive correlation, 0 is no correlation, 
and -1 is a total negative correlation.  Using Pearson’s correlation to measure the linear 
correlation between the level of export taxation and the crop production values for wheat, corn, 
and soybeans, we find that the production level of wheat is directly correlated to the level of 
export tax imposed by the government.  The correlation is significant at the .005 level with a 




Figure 21 – Export Tax Correlation to Food Production & Investment 
 
Another noteworthy find in the quantitative data is the significant correlation between 
the level of export taxation and the level of food production per capita produced by Argentine 
farmers.  The correlation is significant at the .05 level with a value of -.391. This quantitative 
analysis shows a direct correlation between the policies pursued by the Argentine government 
and possible impacts on Argentine agriculture.  This suggests that governmental policies have 
caused skewed incentives that have affected the ability of the nation to feed itself with the 
domestic production of corn, wheat, rice, or barley. 
  
Variable Export Tax Capital Investment per Capita GDP Capita Food Production Per Capita
Export Tax 1 -0.036 -0.207 -.391*
Capital Investment per Capita -0.036 1 .565** -.522**
GDP Capita -0.207 .565** 1 -.526**
Food Production Per Capita -.391* -.522** -.526** 1
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).




CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion 
Argentina is a country richly endowed with natural resources appropriate for agricultural 
production. Such resources have allowed it to be a major player in international commodity 
markets for more than a century.  The experience with liberalized trading policies in the 1990s, 
when discrimination against agriculture was at an historic low level, suggests that the sector is 
extremely responsive to economic incentives. The economic debacle experienced by Argentina 
at the end of 2001 marked a policy reversal and a shift toward more aggressive and 
extractionary policies that have adversely affected the agriculture sector.  The country’s need to 
obtain hard currency and improve fiscal revenues drove the policy changes and has allowed the 
government to continue to pursue populist policies.  
I have suggested that Argentine agricultural output should have been impacted by the 
extractionary policies implemented to support the funding of populist programs.  Although 
agricultural productivity has continued to rise, the government’s policies have had detrimental 
effects on the mix of agricultural commodities, causing producers to favor growing soybeans 
over other crops.  It is clear that the mix of commodities has changed drastically over the past 
twelve years.  It is also clear that there is a correlation between taxation and export control 
levels with the level of food production in Argentina.         
It is not as clear in the data that agricultural investment has changed directly due to the 
impact of export taxes and controls.  The data indicates that the government’s agricultural 
policies have had no significant impact on agricultural investment.  Intuitively however, we 
know that higher taxation and controls on exports negatively affect farm revenue.  Since 
producers rely on the healthier margins to continue making necessary investments, long term 




that the higher import taxes, export taxes, and export controls have caused agricultural 
investment to focus on the commodity where we do see major shifts in production.  The 
available investment capital may be focused on soybean production.  This lower investment 
may account for Argentine producers changing their cropping practices due the efficiency and 
profitability available with soybean production. 
During the period when I have been researching for this work, I’ve had the opportunity 
to visit with people directly tied to the Argentine agricultural industry while in the country.  
There are surprising parallels between farmers in Argentina and those in other advanced 
agricultural producer nations.  Many of the advanced techniques used by farmers in Argentina 
are the same or similar to those of farmers in the mid-west of the United States.  The 
sophistication of modern farming operations and the lev l of technology required have led to a 
consolidation of farming in both Argentina and the United States.  Today, there are fewer, but 
larger, farms in the mid-west.  This has also been th  case in Argentina.  The number of farms 
and farmers has shrunk as farm scale expands and the control of farming shifts to agribusiness.  
During my visits to Argentina, I had the opportunity to discuss the agricultural industry with 
John Deere employees and dealers as well as with two customers that are typical in the industry. 
The first customer was Francisco (Pancho) Garcia Mansillo.  Pancho farms 1560 
hectares (3,744 acres) in the Cordoba Province.  His family has been farming this area of 
Argentina since 1840.  Pancho has been managing the farm since 1986 when he took over the 
operation from his father.  Pancho has nine children. 
As recently as 2000, the Garcia operation was almost exclusively corn and wheat 
production.  By 2012, Pancho had converted 50% of his acreage to no-till, GM soybean 




would be dedicated to wheat as a rotational crop.  Today, however, wheat is less attractive to 
Pancho’s operation and he is converting more of this area to sunflower and peanut production.  
The reason for these cropping decisions is “sadly” (Pancho’s word) government policies that 
restrict exports and control the price that Pancho can get for his production. The policies have 
led farmers to grow more soybeans to stay profitable even though experienced farmers like 
Pancho know that crop rotation is essential to keeping soils healthy.  “You grow other crops to 
rotate and protect the soil,” says Pancho Garcia, “but it means you take a loss on those crops.” 
  The second customer I met is a father and son in Los Quirquinchos.  Roberto (father) 
and Lucas (son) Albanesi have a farming operation that serves as a custom service provider to 
other farmers in their area.  The Albanesi’s manage to farm 700 hectares (1680 acres), 
exclusively in soybeans.  More than 50% of their time is spent providing custom services 
(seeding, spraying, harvesting) to other producers on a contract basis.  According to Roberto, 
soybeans have been the crucial crop that has allowed their entire region to survive as other crops 
have become less profitable.  The region has benefit d from the increased soybean yield from 
GM seeds and from the application of technology.  Good prices for soy products have kept 
production high and income levels sufficient.  Even with the tax rates as high as 30%, precision, 
no-till planting coupled with efficient machinery have allowed their customer’s operations to 
remain profitable.  Roberto expressed serious concern that the prices for soybeans needed to 
remain high.  Without high prices for soybeans and with the difficulty making any real profit 
with other crops due to government policies, the Albanesi operation along with many of their 
neighbors would suffer immensely. 
According to both Pancho Garcia and Roberto Albanesi, soybean production is the 




products and governmental programs that set quotas and tax rates that discourage exportation of 
other crops.  Many farmers in addition to these two have made this same choice and it is 
reflected in the national data (See Figure 13).  The Kirchner administration has indirectly fueled 
the expansion of soy production through policies that were supposed to promote wealth 
distribution and to secure food for domestic consumption.  The government imposed price caps 
and export quotas on select products (wheat, milk, and meat in particular) in order to ensure 
food supply in the domestic market.  The adverse impact of these policies is also demonstrated 
in the national data with the correlation between the export tax imposed by the government and 
the per capita wheat production.  Government policies have pushed these producers toward 
soybean production.  The unintended consequence of polices adopted to protect domestic food 
supply has been to actually produce food insecurity in Argentina.  Argentina has nearly lost its 
food sovereignty; that is, its ability to feed its own population.  
The trouble with agriculture in Argentina is the result of the government’s blunders in 
economic policy. The blunders will continue to impede economic growth and will reduce 
government revenue at a time when its debt is overwh lming.  Understanding how Argentina 
has gotten to this point is essential for suggesting how Argentina might turn around its sinking 
economy and perhaps achieve sustainable long-term growth.  Growth will depend on 
Argentines electing a government that will implement policies that encourage individuals to 
work, promote entrepreneurship, boost individual savings, and reward investment.  Crucial to 
this course correction will be tax rates that are not arbitrary or overly burdensome, coupled with 
a reliable and stable currency.  Above all, Argentina needs a government and legal system that 





I have suggested that Argentine agricultural output should have been impacted by the 
extractionary policies implemented to support the funding of populist programs.  Although 
agricultural productivity has continued to rise, the government’s policies have had detrimental 
effects on the mix of agricultural commodities, causing producers to favor growing soybeans 
over other crops.  It is clear that the mix of commodities has changed drastically over the past 
twelve years and due to this changing mix, Argentina will likely not be self-sufficient for food.  
It is clear that there is a correlation between taxa ion and export control levels with the level of 
food production in Argentina.  It is not as clear in the data that agricultural investment has 
changed directly due to the impact of export taxes and controls.   
The objective of this case study has been to analyze the impact of Argentine domestic 
agricultural policies on agricultural production and i vestment.  This study comprises two 
separate but related analyses on changes to commodity production and infrastructure investment 
based on the impact of export taxes in Argentina.  B sed on my results, what one would expect 
to see as evidence of flawed policies is not evident in the macro data available for levels of 
agricultural investment.  However, the results are suggestive and the implication is that long run 
policies that distort prices and investment decision  will hurt farmers and farm production in the 
end. 
Obviously, without the current tax and quota structure, Argentine soybean farmers 
would be more competitive, more profitable, and better positioned to make investments for the 
future.   The farmers are currently being penalized for selling soybeans, albeit less that the 
penalties for selling other commodities, so there must be some long-term economic rents.  We 
see evidence that producers are adapting their crop systems in innovative ways that are both 




storage is a case in point.  It is also clear that t e domestic policies and export taxation have led 
to a significant consolidation of the agricultural productive capacity of Argentina toward 
soybean production.  The long-term, detrimental impacts of this consolidation on the 
environment and on the health of the Argentina agricultural economy are as of yet unclear.  This 
may require further investigation to determine where the impacts materialize. 
It is clear that the growth of soybean production has ad positive effects for Argentina.  
Soybean exports have kept currency flowing into Argentina and have kept the government 
solvent, at least for now.  Soybeans have also contributed to the adoption of new technologies 
like no-till cropping and biotechnological innovations (GM seeds, fertilizers and herbicides) and 
the more intensive use of agricultural machinery. 
Unfortunately, the consolidation to soy production has generated a heavy dependence on 
a single commodity with a serious lack of commercial d versification.  This one product 
(soybean bean and its derived products) has come to represent 20-25% of the total exports of 
Argentina and has displaced the production of other products across the agricultural industry.  I 
have focused this analysis on the impacts to agricultural investment and specific commodities.  
However, the domestic policies driving this dependence on soy products are also having 
detrimental effects on other agricultural products as well.  Argentina was once the world leader 
in beef exports.  Argentina’s ranchers and farmers produced more than 3.1 million tons of beef, 
exporting some 745,000 metric tons to the world market.  Argentina was the third largest beef 
exporting country (behind Brazil and Australia) in the world in 2005.  Unfortunately for the 
beef industry, in March 2006 the Argentine governmet banned beef exports for 180 days in an 
effort to lower the domestic price of beef.  The government followed that up by imposing a 15% 




the domestic beef prices.  Unfortunately (again), the Kirchner government assumed ranchers 
and farmers would continue to raise cheap beef for the domestic market.  Instead, they cut their 
herds and converted their pastures to soybean producti n, which was more profitable than 
raising cattle for the artificially depressed beef market.  The US Department of Agriculture 
reports that in 2012 Argentina exported only 164,000 metric tons of beef (11th place globally). 
Finally, the role the state and domestic policies in Argentina have played in relation to 
the agricultural production must be understood.  Increased social spending and infrastructure 
investment certainly improve people’s well-being, in particular that of the poorest.  The 
apparent success of GM soy has helped legitimize the Kirchner model for redistribution.  The 
immense expansion of soybean production and the appropriation of a large portion of the profits 
to the benefit of many rather than the few reinforce the idea that the populist model is an 
appropriate method for redistribution.  However, the potential of populism in Argentina to fully 
address social problems is questionable.  Since the funding for the government’s social 
programs relies so heavily on soybean production and exports, any disruption in the price or 
demand for soy products is likely to have significant impacts on the government’s ability to 
fund its programs.  In the medium term, this is a highly unstable economic model that is subject 
to cycles of boom and bust.  Soy production in Argentina is driven by constantly expanding 
international demand (China and India), which has caused prices to go up and has absorbed 
increasing production.  As with any cycle of boom and bust, however, the question is not if 
demand will ever slow down, but rather when it will happen, and how hard it will hit. 
As of this writing, the outcome for Argentina’s agricultural industry is unclear.  The 
international commodity price for soybeans has already fallen to half the price in 2011.  The 




future.  The outcome of the politics deciding the future direction of the Argentine government 
after the current administration will have critical implications for the future performance of 
Argentinean agriculture. The sector tended to languish when policies were highly 
discriminatory against it.  However, the producers within this economic sector are resilient and 
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